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Health statusRecent empirical work on individual portfolio choice focuses on the role of the individual's health in making ﬁ-
nancial decisions. The key idea is that, through precautionary saving or reducing investors' time horizon, health
issues make people choose safer ﬁnancial portfolios. This paper questions the empirical relevance of the link be-
tween health and portfolio choice, measured as stockownership and overall fraction of risky securities held. We
handle with caution the ﬁndings from previous papers and askwhether data from the ﬁrst wave of the Survey of
Health, Aging and Retirement in Europe (SHARE) are able to clarify some of our doubts. We ﬁnd that only poor
self-reported health negatively impacts the portfolio choice, while other health measures (chronic conditions,
limitations in daily activities of life, mental health) are irrelevant for investment decisions.
© 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
The Modern Portfolio Theory (MPT) postulates that risk averse
investors choose their investment portfolios in order to maximize
their expected return for a predetermined level of risk. The optimal
portfolio chosen by the investor will depend on the shape of her utility
function. In recent years, the basic assumptions of MPT have been
widely challenged by the behavioral ﬁnance approach, which has
thrown new insight onto investment decision theory. Behavioral
ﬁnance evaluates risk mostly based on laboratory experiments and
surveys or questionnaire instruments, and concentrates on beliefs,
attitudes and risk perception in particular circumstances. Among other
factors, an individual's health status has recently gained attention as a
potential determinant of risk perception and security holdings. Recent
literature has developed a portfolio choice theory which includes the
presence of “background” risk, deﬁned as an uninsurable component
of individuals' income risk which decreases additional ﬁnancial risks
(Gollier, 2001; Guiso, Jappelli, & Terlizzese, 1996; Guiso & Paiella,
2001). Some researchers have put effort into demonstrating how health
can be regarded as a form of background risk, and provide empirical
results on how ﬁnancial investment choices change with health condi-
tions. The most frequent ﬁnding is that, a sudden health issue or poor
health conditions tend to shift resources towards safer types of ﬁnancial
investments, with disaffection from the participation to the equitynice, Department of Economics,
64.market and from the holding of risky securities. Papers support with
various arguments the way in which health affects portfolio choice.
Some sustain that there is a precautionary saving purpose behind the
health effect, to the extent that the expected future medical expendi-
tures subtract resources from ﬁnancial investments (among others,
see Atella, Brunetti, & Maestas, 2012; Berkowitz & Qiu, 2006; Goldman
& Maestas, 2007; Gollier & Pratt, 1996; Heaton & Lucas, 2000; Pang &
Warshawsky, 2010; Pratt & Zeckhauser, 1987). Others consider the
interplay between health and other circumstances which affect the life
span horizon, such as aging (Coile &Milligan, 2009) or bequest motives
(Feinstein & Lin, 2006). Finally, some papers propose models where
health enters as a direct argument of the investor utility function,
and the marginal utility of consumption is found to vary with health
(among others, see Cardak & Wilkins, 2009; Edwards, 2008; Finkelstein,
Luttmer, & Notowidigdo, 2008; Love & Smith, 2010; Rosen &Wu, 2004).
Evidently, the relationship occurring between health status and portfolio
choice is actively discussed in the literature, and the standpoint of
researchers in the ﬁeld is extremely heterogeneous.
With this work we wish to take part in this debate, and our focus is
on deeply understanding whether there is a relevant link between
health status and portfolio choice. More speciﬁcally, we contribute to
the previous literature surveying the individual health condition in a
more extensive way. Since the health dimension is characterized by
various different facets, our analysis aims at establishing the relation-
ship occurring with portfolio decisions from different proxies of health,
where each proxy should reﬂect a speciﬁc health dimension (subjective,
objective, andmental health).Weuse data contained in theﬁrstwave of
the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE), which
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countries. We concentrate on the decision of households on their
stockholding, and on the relative share of their portfolio which is
invested into risky assets. Our empiricalmodels relate these two choices
on the household health condition, while controlling for a large number
of individual and household characteristics, as the household composi-
tion and various socio-economic features. We mainly test the most
common channels that the literature so far has suggested as drivers
for the impact fromhealth on investments, and thatwe havementioned
few rows above. In particular, we check whether the implication from
health on portfolio choice is imputable to precautionary saving and/or
risk aversion changes. Despite we cannot rule out if one channel is
more effective than the other, our results suggest that, a signiﬁcant
path from health on portfolio choice is only associable to a measure of
subjective health. More speciﬁcally, people self-reporting a negative
health condition are found to be less likely in owning some stocks and
are holding fewer risky assets. If we insteadmeasure the physical health
status of the same respondents (counting the number of limitations in
daily life activities or the number of chronic diseases), or measure
their psychological feelings (through a depression scale), than it does
not hold any more that being worse in health has signiﬁcant affections
on investments. Our results show that, the prediction of a negative
health risk on ﬁnancial choices highly depends on the notion of health
we refer to, since we showed that different health measures might
yield inconsistent results. The rest of the paper is organized as follows:
Section 2 reviews the most relevant contributions to the literature
which has surveyed the effect of health status on portfolio choice;
Sections 3 and 4 present the data and describe in more detail the vari-
ables of interest; Section 5 reports the econometric results; Section 6
provides the conclusions and some discussion of the results, comparing
them with previous contributions in the literature.2. The effect of health status on portfolio choice
There is abundant evidence of an association between economic
measures, such as income and wealth, and a variety of variables which
are linked to the state of health of individuals. Indeed, several studies
conﬁrm the existence of a link between the two spheres. However,
there is still no consensus on the nature and the direction of this
relationship. On the one hand, changes in socio-economic status may
lead to worse health status. On the other hand, also changes of the
health status may have an impact on the individuals' income and
wealth: a poor health status, limiting the ability to work and increasing
medical costs, could restrict opportunities for individual income and
accumulated wealth. According to Palumbo (1999), the expectation of
substantial future medical expenses reduces, as a precautionary mea-
sure, the current and future consumption. Moreover, if the marginal
utility of consumption decreases with worsening health conditions, in-
dividuals will be inclined to consumemorewhen they are healthy com-
pared to periods in which they are sick, and save more when the
probability of a worsening of their health status increases. Closely relat-
ed to this is the question of the impact of a poor health status on life ex-
pectancy: in life-cycle models, the mortality risk induces a transfer of
future consumption towards the present. Smith (1999) ﬁnds that
under the risk of future health problems, subjects might be induced to
reduce the transfer of wealth to heirs, rather than decrease their-
consumption. According to this logic, current status of health and
probability to leave an inheritance are strongly correlated.
In the following paragraphs, we focus on the recent literature
that studies the relationship between health status and portfolio
choices. Previous contributions in the empirical literature suggest
different channels through which health might affect ﬁnancial
decisions, i.e. precautionary saving motive, direct effect of marginal
utility of consumption, and the perception of the life span and
planning horizon.2.1. First channel: precautionary saving motive
The fear of potential health shocks can lead to highermedical spend-
ing which absorbs the ﬁnancial wealth of the investor. In this view,
health expenditures is a type of undiversiﬁable background risk that in-
duces precautionary saving and prompts safer portfolios (among all:
Atella et al., 2012; Berkowitz & Qiu, 2006; Goldman & Maestas, 2007;
Gollier & Pratt, 1996; Heaton & Lucas, 2000; Pang & Warshawsky,
2010; Pratt & Zeckhauser, 1987). Our work attempts to complement
the works by Atella et al. (2012) and Guiso et al. (1996). The former
uses the same data source as our current research (the Survey of Health,
Aging and Retirement in Europe, SHARE) to show how health risk
affects the portfolio choice only of those investors living in countries
with a less protective healthcare system. Their result highlights the
role of national healthcare systems in reducing the overall background
risk faced by households and, consequently, in dampening the precau-
tionary saving purpose. Guiso et al. (1996) use data from the Survey of
Household Income and Wealth, and focuses on the investigation of the
relationship between stockholding choices and different household
characteristics. The authors argue that, among other factors, future
medical expenses are a common source of risk, as they ﬁnd that house-
holds headed by individuals who spent more days sick tend to hold
safer ﬁnancial portfolios, even after controlling for many other individ-
ual characteristics.
2.2. Second channel: direct effect on the marginal utility of consumption
Health status could have an impact on ﬁnancial decisions through its
direct effect on themarginal utility of consumption. Edwards (2010) ex-
plores the implications for portfolio choice of a special type of state-
dependent utility function, which includes consumption and health.
The author proves that, if the cross partial derivative of utility with re-
spect to consumption and health is negative, then investors who per-
ceive their health status as poor will hedge by holding safer ﬁnancial
portfolios. Finkelstein et al. (2008) use seven waves of panel data on
older individuals from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) and esti-
mate how individual adverse health events affect a proxy for utility,
comparing the effects across people of different income levels. They
ﬁnd robust evidence of the fact that deteriorations in health are associ-
ated to a statistically signiﬁcant decline in the marginal utility of con-
sumption. Cardak and Wilkins (2009) use data from the Household
Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) survey to investigate
the determinants of the portfolio allocation of Australian households.
Their results suggest that the share of risky assets held in ﬁnancial port-
folios is signiﬁcantly and negatively affected by poor health status. They
retain that poor health conditions reduce risky asset holdings via its ef-
fects on measured risk and time preferences. In their analysis, house-
holds that consider themselves ﬁnancially risk averse have a much
lower risky asset ratio. Using data from the Health and Retirement
Study (HRS), Rosen andWu (2004) ﬁnd that a fair or poor health status
reduces the probability of holding risky assets as well as the portfolio
shares held in those assets. Possible explanations for this outcome are
explored using variables for health insurance, bequest motive and plan-
ning horizon, though, according to their analyses, none of these latter
ways seems to be the channel through which health status explicates
an effect on portfolio composition.
2.3. Third channel: life span and planning horizon
A third potential channel is through life span and time horizon. All
things equal, advancing age leaves less time remaining before death,
which may be a reason to invest more safely.
Using data from the Health and Retirement Survey (HRS), Coile and
Milligan (2009) focus on the inﬂuence of aging and health shocks on
households' portfolio choice, and ﬁnd that health shocks explain part
of the changes in households' portfolios over time. Feinstein and Lin
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results based on simulations from the model. Among their ﬁndings,
authors show that elderly agents in poor health and exposed to greater
health expenditure risk, place a slightly lower proportion of their assets
in stocks than individuals in good health. A related issue is the bequest
motive. Hurd (2002) claims that, while for young people this is quite a
remote event, for aged people a bequest motive can extend the time
horizon, reducing the effects of mortality risk.3. Data
In this study, we use data contained in the ﬁrst wave of SHARE, the
Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe; its main focus is
to provide information on the lives of Europeans aged 50 and over,
collecting data in 11 countries from Scandinavia to the Mediterranean.
The survey covers 19,548 households and 28,517 individuals on a
wide range of topics, encompassing health, socioeconomic status,
ﬁnancial transfers, and intensity of social interaction. For our research,
particular attention goes to variables expressing wealth and health
conditions. From these, we manage to construct indicators for portfolio
choice and to relate them to different health proxies. Some of the
questions refer to the household while others are posed to the single
respondent. In this case, since our analysis mainly focuses on the house-
holds, we combine individual information and take the household
average.4. Measuring health status
SHARE devotes a section of the questionnaire to measuring health
status. Empirically, health status is an intrinsically unobservable
variable. A formal deﬁnition of health status unavoidably involves a
number of facets suggesting an exploration of different variables avail-
able in SHARE to take into account the multiple dimensions among
which the notion of health develops. As a ﬁrst approximation, we can
divide the information of health status into objective and subjective.
Concerning theﬁrst category, SHAREprovides thenumber of limitations
in activities of daily living and the number of chronic diseases.1
Regarding the second category, SHARE provides information on self-
perceived health status (SPHEU), reported on a 5-point scale (1 = Ex-
cellent, 2 = Very Good, 3 = Good, 4 = Fair, 5 = Poor). As Rosen and
Wu (2004) and Atella et al. (2012) point out, many contributions in
the literature document the validity of self-reported health status. The
last relevant health variable included in SHARE is mental health. This
is measured by a depression scale variable (EURO-D) which runs from
0 to 12, counting whether the individual reported having problems
during the last month from a list of negative feelings, including depres-
sion, pessimism, guilt, irritability and tearfulness. Fig. 1 provides the
sample distributions of the four indicators of health status. Descriptive
statistics (see Table 1) show that only 9.5% of the sample have some lim-
itations with activities of daily living (the dummy variable ADL2 de-
notes whether the respondent suffers at least one limitation) and the
average number is 0.183 (st.dev. 0.624). More than 41% of the sample
declare two or more chronic diseases (the dummy variable chronic2
denotes whether the respondent suffers at least one chronic disease)
and the average number of chronic diseases is 1.513 (st. dev. 1.308).
More than 37% of the sample perceive a subjective health status as
being fair or poor, and the average point-scale is 2.301 (st. dev. 0.838).
Only 6% of the sample has a depression scale higher than 7, and the av-
erage scale is 2.339 (st. dev. 2.086). Table 2 also shows a high level of
heterogeneity across countries.1 The former includes difﬁculty in dressing, walking, bathing, eating, getting in or out of
bed and using the toilet (ADL). The latter includes heart attack, high blood pressure, high
blood cholesterol, diabetes, asthma, arthritis, osteoporosis, Parkinson's and cancer
(chronic).5. Stockownership and risky investment
During the investment process, an individualmakes the crucial deci-
sion whether or not to spend some of his resources in ﬁnancial securi-
ties traded in organized exchange markets. SHARE respondents are
asked about the amount of money they hold in the following ﬁnancial
products: bank accounts, bonds, stocks, individual retirement accounts,
contractual savings for housing, whole and term life insurance. As in
Christelis, Jappelli, and Padula (2010), we distinguish between direct
stockownership and total stockownership, which includes stocks held
directly plus stocks held through mutual funds and investment
accounts.
In our sample we capture these features of the portfolio choice by
two dichotomous variables. The variable for direct stockownership as-
sumes value one if the household has invested any positive amount in
stocks. The variable for total stockownership assumes value one if the
household has invested into stocks, or mutual funds, or individual in-
vestment accounts, assuming these two latter ﬁnancial products have
a certain share invested as well into stocks. Table 3 provides some de-
scriptive statistics on direct and total stockholding. Thirteen percent of
our sample invests directly in stocks, while more than twice that
(26.7%) holds stocks either directly or through mutual funds and indi-
vidual retirement accounts. This table also shows a high level of hetero-
geneity in stockholding across European countries.
While structuring the investment portfolio and in accordance with
main insight provided byportfolio theory, the individual typically diver-
siﬁes among different classes of ﬁnancial assets. For this reason, in our
sample we deﬁne the “risky” fraction of the investment portfolio of
our households as the sumof stocks, mutual funds and individual retire-
ment accounts over the total gross ﬁnancial wealth.
6. Unconditional relationship between stock market participation
and health status
Our purpose is to investigate the relationship linking stockholding
and risky investment to health conditions, identiﬁed by four variables
(disabilities in daily life activities (ADL), chronic conditions, self-
perceived health status (SPHEU) and mental health). To get a ﬁrst
glance of the type of connection, in Figs. 2 and 3 we plot stockholding
and risky investments (respectively) over the four proxies of health
conditions. In general, objective health seems to have a negative rela-
tionshipwith both stockholding and the relative amount of risky invest-
ments, though the path is not continuous and some discontinuities
are observable for a large number of limitations or chronic diseases
(see Fig. 2a and b). The effect of SPHEU is clearer. The dependent vari-
able in Fig. 2c decreases continuously, suggesting that, as long as the in-
dividual reports a poorer view of himself, he tends to leave the equity
market and drive resource towards other different and “safer” form of
investments. Fig. 3c clearly shows that while people reporting excellent
health conditions hold 20% of their resources in risky assets, individuals
in poor health status reduce this proportion to below 5%. The effect has
the same direction when we consider the mental health indicator
EUROD, and in Figs. 2d and 3d we see how the more symptoms of
depression are declared, than the more are discouraged riskier invest-
ment choices.
7. Conditional relationship between stock market participation and
health status
An unconditional analysis may hide the role of other explanatory
variables affecting stockholding. For this reason, we estimate a regres-
sion model for each of our three dependent variables (direct
stockholding, total stockholding, share of risky investment), in which
we consider stockholding or the share of risky investment on the left
hand side and health status plus a set of control variables on the right
hand side. In particular we include the following control variables: age
Fig. 1. Sample distributions of the health status indicators.
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employment characteristics, indicators of household resources (gross
ﬁnancial income, real assets and household disposable income), a
variable for social activities, a set of indicators for cognitive abilities,
and the expectations of leaving an inheritance and country dummies.
The four proxies of health status (number of limitation in daily life
activities, number of chronic conditions, self-perceived health status
and mental health) are considered separately.
To model the stock holding decision more formally, we assume that
households compare the utility gain from owning stocks with the entry
cost. We express the net utility as:
yh ¼ X
0
hδþ εh
where h is the household index and Xh are the observable variables
affecting the utility gain from owning stocks. Household h owns stocks
if yh⁎ ≥ 0, which implies that the probability of observing stock-
ownership is Φ(X′ hδ). If the unobservable factors are normally distrib-
uted, we can use a probit model for direct and total stock market
participation estimated with standard maximum likelihood methods.
The probit model allows interpreting the estimated marginal effects of
the independent variables as their impact on the probability that the
household holds some stocks in its portfolio (directly, or, also via “indi-
rect” ownership of stocks). For the share of risky investment we use a
censored normal regressionmodel (or Tobitmodel) to take into account
the fact that an optimizing behavior often leads to corner solutions for
some nontrivial fraction of the population. Indeed, for some households
the optimal share of risky investment coincideswith the corner solution
of zero investment (seeMiniaci &Weber, 2002; Rosen &Wu, 2004 for a
review and summary of various econometric issues in estimatingportfolio choice models). With the Tobit model we estimate how a
one unit change in the independent variables affects uncensored obser-
vations. In the set Xh of observable variables we include age and
its square, a scaled variable for the education level, the number of
household members, a dummy for self-employment, indicators of
household resources (gross ﬁnancial income, real assets and household
disposable income), a variable for social activities, a set of indicators for
cognitive abilities, and the expectations of leaving an inheritance. To
these regressors we add a variable expressive of the health status.
Given the complexity of the deﬁnition of health status, data enable us
to investigate the effect of health on portfolio choice among four differ-
ent dimensions. In each speciﬁcation the health proxy is changed and
the regression is run anew, according to which health explanatory
variable is considered. The ﬁrst two health proxies (number of limita-
tion in activities of daily life – ADL – and number of chronic diseases)
are regarded as a measure of the individual objective health. The third
variable is a proxy of a more subjective and personal dimension of
health, the health condition as reported by the person interviewed,
according to his or her feeling and judgment (SPHEU). The fourth vari-
able is the indicator of themental health of the individual (EUROD), and
takes into account reported negative psychological feelings. The four
health proxies are then considered simultaneously and, given the low
correlation among them and the large sample size, we do not worry
about multicollinearity.
8. Econometric results
This section presents,ﬁrst of all, the baseline results.We then discuss
the results obtained from a deeper analysis conducted to disentangle
the channels of health risk transmission.
Table 1
Descriptive statistics of health conditions.
Variable Mean Std. dev. Min Max Obs.
Number of limitations in activities of daily life (ADL) 0.183 0.624 0 6 18,402
ADL2 0.095 0.266 0 1 18,402
Number of chronic diseases (chronic) 1.513 1.308 0 10 18,402
Chronic2 0.411 0.444 0 1 18,402
Self-reported health (SPHEU) 2.301 0.838 1 5 18,402
SPHEU2 0.374 0.439 0 1 18,402
Depression (EUROD) 2.339 2.086 0 12 18,402
EUROD2 0.061 0.221 0 1 18,402
The variables are taken at their household mean value.
Table 2
Descriptive statistics of health conditions by country.
Austria Germany Sweden Netherland Spain Italy
Number of limitations in activities of daily life (ADL) 0.171 0.171 0.160 0.151 0.262 0.219
Number of chronic diseases (chronic) 1.266 1.461 1.507 1.290 1.822 1.702
Self-reported health (SPHEU) 2. 332 2.471 2.169 2.195 2.577 2.565
Depression (EUROD) 2.002 1.939 2.021 2.050 3.155 2.914
Observations 1371 1927 2066 1851 1630 1703
France Denmark Greece Switzerland Belgium
Number of limitations in activities of daily life (ADL) 0.187 0.200 0.149 0.098 0.204
Number of chronic diseases (chronic) 1.559 1.603 1.411 1.036 1.656
Self-reported health (SPHEU) 2.328 2.173 2.180 1.894 2.205
Depression (EUROD) 2.856 1.872 2.244 1.953 2.373
Observations 1880 1117 1818 649 2390
The variables are taken at their household mean value. Standard errors in parentheses.
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As mentioned above, we build a regression model for each of our
three dependent variables (direct stockholding, total stockholding, frac-
tion of risky investment). Tables 4 and 5 provide the results for the effect
of health status on direct stockholding and total stockholding, respec-
tively. Table 6 contains the outcome of the regression estimated for
the fraction of risky investment. The whole set of health variables has
a negative effect on both stock market participation decision as well as
on thepercentage of risk carried by theportfolio. Between the twoprox-
ies of objective health status (ADL and chronic), statistically signiﬁcant
effects are found only for the indicator of chronic diseases with respect
to direct stockholding. The results become highly signiﬁcant when the
health indicator is allowed to coincide with the self-reported health
conditions. Tables 4, 5 and 6 show that SPHEU has got a signiﬁcantly
negative effect on all the dependent variables; bad self-perceived healthTable 3
Descriptive statistics of stockholding and risky investment by country.
Whole sample Austria
Direct stockholding 0.175
(0.380)
0.055
(0.229)
Total stockholding 0.327
(0.469)
0.104
(0.305)
Risky investment 0.158
(0.288)
0.037
(0.145)
Observations 18,402 1371
Italy France Den
Direct stockholding 0.056
(0.231)
0.163
(0.370)
0.34
(0.4
Total stockholding 0.140
(0.347)
0.434
(0.496)
0.56
(0.4
Risky investment 0.070
(0.209)
0.222
(0.323)
0.25
(0.3
Observations 1703 1880 111
The variables are taken at their household mean value. Standard errors in parentheses.status would lead individuals to reduce both their equity investment
and their ﬁnancial risk-taking. In absolute terms, the marginal effect of
SPHEU is alwaysmuch larger than themarginal effect of the other prox-
ies. We estimate a marginal effect of SPHEU of−0.013 (st. err. 0.004)
and−0.033 (st. err. 0.006) for the direct and total stockholding respec-
tively, and a coefﬁcient of−0.064 (st. err. 0.012) for risky investment.
The marginal effects of chronic diseases are −0.005 (st. err. 0.002),
−0.006 (st. err. 0.004) for direct and total stockholding respectively,
and the coefﬁcient is −0.011 (st. err. 0.007) for risky investment,
while for EUROD the effect is negative and statistically signiﬁcant only
for the fraction of risky investment (coefﬁcient−0.013, st. err. 0.004).
To provide a broader overview of the negative impact of health risk on
the portfolio decision,we include the four health proxies simultaneously
in the explanatory set of the estimated speciﬁcations. As seen in Table 7,
SPHEU remains signiﬁcantly negative across speciﬁcations, while the
other three proxies of health status are not statistically relevant.Germany Sweden Netherland Spain
0.148
(0.355)
0.422
(0.494)
0.190
(0.392)
0.071
(0.257)
0.282
(0.450)
0.751
(0.433)
0.265
(0.442)
0.142
(0.349)
0.099
(0.217)
0.438
(0.354)
0.097
(0.223)
0.078
(0.221)
1927 2066 1851 1630
mark Greece Switzerland Belgium
1
74)
0.063
(0.243)
0.270
(0.444)
0.190
(0.392)
8
96)
0.109
(0.312)
0.359
(0.480)
0.395
(0.489)
0
24)
0.045
(0.158)
0.158
(0.286)
0.190
(0.309)
7 1818 649 2390
Fig. 2. Direct and total stock market participation by health status.
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In this section we try to disentangle the different channels through
which health risk may have an effect on investment decisions, thus we
wish to provide information on the reasons which bring people in badFig. 3. Percentage of risky invhealth to disaffect from the equity market and to decrease the level of ﬁ-
nancial risk undertaken. A deeper understanding of the channels of health
risk transmission is important because it might involve relevant policy
implications. Indeed, it would help to introduce incentives speciﬁcally de-
signed to increase the stock market participation. As mentioned inestment by health status.
Table 4
Probit regressions for direct stockholding — alternative proxies for health status.
Direct stockholding (1)
dy/dx
(2)
dy/dx
(3)
dy/dx
(4)
dy/dx
Number of limitations in activities of daily life (ADL) −0.004
(0.005)
Number of chronic diseases (chronic) −0.005**
(0.002)
Self-reported health (SPHEU) −0.013***
(0.004)
Depression (EUROD) −0.002
(0.001)
Age 0.003
(0.004)
0.003
(0.004)
0.003
(0.004)
0.003
(0.004)
Age squared −0.000
(0.000)
−0.000
(0.000)
−0.000
(0.000)
−0.000
(0.000)
Number of household components 0.022***
(0.005)
0.022***
(0.005)
0.023***
(0.005)
0.021***
(0.005)
Education level 0.022***
(0.002)
0.022***
(0.002)
0.021***
(0.002)
0.022***
(0.002)
Numeracy 0.022***
(0.003)
0.022***
(0.003)
0.021***
(0.003)
0.022***
(0.003)
Fluency 0.001**
(0.000)
0.001**
(0.000)
0.001**
(0.000)
0.001**
(0.000)
Recall 0.006***
(0.002)
0.006***
(0.002)
0.005***
(0.002)
0.006***
(0.002)
Employed 0.001
(0.008)
0.000
(0.008)
−0.001
(0.008)
0.000
(0.008)
Social activities 0.027***
(0.006)
0.027***
(0.006)
0.025***
(0.006)
0.026***
(0.006)
Probability of leaving an inheritance greater than 50,000 euro 0.001***
(0.000)
0.001***
(0.000)
0.001***
(0.000)
0.001***
(0.000)
Household income (in 100,000 euro) 0.004**
(0.002)
0.004**
(0.002)
0.004**
(0.002)
0.004**
(0.002)
Real assets (in 100,000 euro) 0.001***
(0.000)
0.001***
(0.000)
0.001***
(0.000)
0.001***
(0.000)
Household ﬁnancial assets (in 100,000 euro) 0.028***
(0.004)
0.027***
(0.004)
0.027***
(0.003)
0.027***
(0.004)
R2 0.222 0.222 0.223 0.222
Observations 18,402 18,402 18,402 18,402
Estimation is performed at household level and the variables are taken at their household mean value.
Each regression includes a complete set of country dummies.
We report the marginal effects. Standard errors are in parentheses.
Signiﬁcance: *10%, **5%, ***1% conﬁdence levels.
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tionary savingmotive, direct effect on themarginal utility of consumption
(pure risk aversion), and the perception of life span. Let us start from the
latter. Bad health is perceived as a factor that shortens the individual time
horizon, with the consequence of setting up safer portfolios. Moreover,
investors' age can affect directly portfolio allocations, independently on
its effect on health, as Ameriks and Zeldes (2004) point out in their
exhaustive survey. They ﬁnd that the direction of the effect is far from
simple, since it depends on the choice of the utility function, the correla-
tion of income and rate of return shocks, transaction costs, the behavior
of risk aversion over the lifetime, and taxes.
In our speciﬁcations, we always check for age and age squared and
the results show that these variables are almost never signiﬁcant,
suggesting that age per se has no explanatory power on portfolio choice.
All our models have been augmented by an interaction term between
the health proxies and a dummy variable denoting whether the age
level is above or equal to 65 (see Table 8). Again, the proxy of self-
perceived health status is always statistically signiﬁcant at the 1%
level, and the marginal effect for the stock market participation is
even slightly lower in absolute value for people aged 65+, evidence
that would suggest the idea that our results would not be importantly
driven by the older fraction of the population. Another way to test this
channel of health risk transmission might be taking into account the
individual life expectancy. SHARE questionnaire asks respondents
about their life expectancy. In particular, they are requested to declaretheir expected probability of living for the next ten years. Taking the
complement to 1, we get a proxy for the expectation of dying within
the same time horizon. The interaction of such a variable with health
would measure the effect on portfolio choice of bad health conditions
accompanied by an increase in the expectation of not living for more
than ten years. Table 9 shows that the direction of this effect is not
clear and in none of the cases signiﬁcant. Health still continues to have
a negative impact on investments and this effect could not be strongly
addressed to the reduction in the planning horizon.
As already noticed, another important factor that may affect the
perception of the length of the life span is the expectation to leave a
bequest. For this reason, in all speciﬁcations we control for the bequest
motive measured by the probability of leaving an inheritance larger
than 50,000 euro. The results show that when taking into account the be-
questmotive aswell, the negative relationship between stockholding and
the proxies of health status still holds. Overall, the results seem to suggest
that the shorteningof life span is not a channel of health risk transmission.
Another potential channel for health risk transmission is identiﬁed
as the “precautionary savingmotive”. According to this view, the threat
of sustaining unexpected medical payments determines estrangement
from risky securities, while holding safer portfolios should guarantee
available resources for future health expenditures. To stress this idea,
we use the information related to the purchase of private health
insurance. If health insurance offers a buffer towards future health
expenditures, then we would expect that the connection between
Table 5
Probit regressions for total stockholding — alternative proxies for health status.
Total stockholding (1)
dy/dx
(2)
dy/dx
(3)
dy/dx
(4)
dy/dx
Number of limitations in activities of daily life (ADL) −0.004
(0.009)
Number of chronic diseases (chronic) −0.006*
(0.004)
Self-reported health (SPHEU) −0.033***
(0.006)
Depression (EUROD) −0.004
(0.002)
Age 0.013*
(0.006)
0.013**
(0.006)
0.013**
(0.006)
0.012*
0.006
Age squared −0.000**
(0.000)
−0.000***
(0.000)
−0.000**
(0.000)
−0.000**
(0.000)
Number of household components 0.032***
(0.009)
0.031***
(0.009)
0.033***
(0.009)
0.031***
(0.009)
Education level 0.036***
(0.004)
0.036***
(0.004)
0.035***
(0.004)
0.036***
(0.004)
Numeracy 0.036***
(0.006)
0.035***
(0.006)
0.033***
(0.006)
0.035***
(0.006)
Fluency 0.003***
(0.001)
0.003***
(0.001)
0.003***
(0.001)
0.003***
(0.001)
Recall 0.007**
(0.003)
0.007**
(0.003)
0.006**
(0.003)
0.007**
(0.003)
Employed 0.010
(0.013)
0.009
(0.013)
0.003
(0.013)
0.009
(0.013)
Social activities 0.078***
(0.012)
0.078***
(0.012)
0.073***
(0.012)
0.077***
(0.012)
Probability of leaving an inheritance greater than 50,000 euro 0.001***
(0.000)
0.001***
(0.000)
0.001***
(0.000)
0.001***
(0.000)
Household income (in 100,000 euro) 0.008
(0.006)
0.008
(0.006)
0.008
(0.006)
0.008
(0.006)
Real assets (in 100,000 euro) 0.002***
(0.000)
0.002***
(0.000)
0.002***
(0.000)
0.002***
(0.000)
Household ﬁnancial assets
(In 100,000 euro)
0.139***
(0.009)
0.139***
(0.008)
0.137***
(0.008)
0.139***
(0.009)
R2 0.298 0.298 0.300 0.298
Observations 18,402 18,402 18,402 18,402
Same as in Table 6.
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We test this hypothesis in the same way as Rosen and Wu (2004),
and include in all our models a dummy variable denoting whether the
individual owns any private health insurance or not. Results are report-
ed in Table 10. Our outcome is similar to Rosen and Wu (2004) in two
aspects: the results show i) the positive and signiﬁcant marginal effect
of health insurance on portfolio choice, and ii) the negative effect
of health is still persisting despite we check for health insurance owner-
ship. In order to test this issue in a more extensive way, we add
in Table 11 interaction terms between the health status and private
health insurance coverage. Each interaction term should capture the im-
pact of health on the dependent variable as the respondent holds a
private health insurance. Adding the interaction terms, the health insur-
ance dummy is no more signiﬁcant, whereas we observe a positive and
statistically relevant coefﬁcient as we interact the health insurance
dummy with SPHEU. People who are reporting worsening health
conditions are nonetheless incentivized to invest into equities, as
long as they are holding a private health insurance. Although, the esti-
mated total effect from self-perceived health remains negative on
portfolio choice. Interesting results are not found for the other
interactions.
If we previously focused on private health insurance coverage, we
retain that, we should also consider that public health insurance could
have an impact on our results. The presence of a national health system
may weaken the precautionary saving intention of investors, as they
could rely on public health coverage in order to face health shocks,
and ultimately could employ resources for other purposes, affording totake more ﬁnancial risk. Atella et al. (2012) sustain that health risk af-
fects portfolio choices only in countries with less protective healthcare
systems. We run our speciﬁcations splitting the sample in a way similar
to that used in Atella et al. (2012), distinguishing between countries
with a national health system with full coverage (NHS), namely
Denmark, Italy, Spain and Sweden, from those countries with a national
health system with partial coverage (non-NHS), namely Austria,
Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, The Netherlands and Switzerland.
In general, NHS countries grant full coverage for a comprehensive pack-
age of medical expenditures to face negative health events, while in
non-NHS countries the public health system is not fully protective and
several forms of private health insurance cover medical expenditures.
From Table 12 we deduce that SPHEU still continues to be signiﬁ-
cantly negatively estimated across both NHS countries and non-NHS
countries.We also control for the ownership of private health insurance
and its interactions with the four proxies of health status. This table
shows that, in countries with partial coverage, the effect of SPHEU on
stockholding and share of risky investment is negative and signiﬁcant,
and the magnitude of this effect is almost double with respect to coun-
tries characterized by a NHS with full coverage. In non-NHS countries
themarginal effect from the interaction between SPHEU and the private
health insurance dummy is always positive and signiﬁcant, although the
total effect from SPHEU on the total stockholding and the share of risky
investment persists to be negative.
We note that, grouping the countries by national health system like
in Atella et al. (2012) might not be properly recommendable. However,
we wanted to provide results which more seriously consider country
Table 6
Tobit regressions for risky investment — alternative proxies for health status.
Risky Investment (1) (2) (3) (4)
Number of limitations in activities of daily life (ADL) −0.013
(0.017)
Number of chronic diseases (chronic) −0.011
(0.007)
Self-reported health (SPHEU) −0.064***
(0.012)
Depression (EUROD) −0.013***
(0.004)
Age 0.013
(0.011)
0.015
(0.011)
0.014
(0.011)
0.013
(0.011)
Age squared −0.000*
(0.000)
0.000*
(0.000)
−0.000*
(0.000)
−0.000
(0.000)
Number of household components 0.054***
(0.016)
0.053***
(0.016)
0.057***
(0.016)
0.050***
(0.016)
Education level 0.076***
(0.007)
0.076***
(0.007)
0.073***
(0.007)
0.075***
(0.007)
Numeracy 0.068***
(0.010)
0.067***
(0.010)
0.063***
(0.010)
0.065***
(0.010)
Fluency 0.006***
(0.001)
0.006***
(0.001)
0.006***
(0.001)
0.006***
(0.001)
Recall 0.012**
(0.005)
0.012**
(0.005)
0.011**
(0.005)
0.012**
(0.005)
Employed 0.018
(0.024)
0.016
(0.024)
0.006
(0.024)
0.015
(0.024)
Social activities 0.127***
(0.019)
0.127***
(0.019)
0.119***
(0.019)
0.124***
(0.019)
Probability of leaving an inheritance greater than 50,000 euro 0.003***
(0.000)
0.003***
(0.000)
0.002***
(0.000)
0.002***
(0.000)
Household income (in 100,000 euro) 0.009**
(0.006)
0.008**
(0.004)
0.008**
(0.004)
0.008**
(0.005)
Real assets (in 100,000 euro) 0.003***
(0.001)
0.003***
(0.001)
0.003***
(0.001)
0.003***
(0.001)
Household ﬁnancial assets (in 100,000 euro) 0.063***
(0.013)
0.063***
(0.013)
0.062***
(0.013)
0.063***
(0.013)
Pseudo R2 0.211 0.211 0.213 0.211
Observations 18,402 18,402 18,402 18,413
Same as in Table 6.
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indeed highly affected by country characteristics, not only in terms of
healthcare organization, but also concerning the ﬁnancial system and
the development of personal ﬁnance opportunities.
Finally, in order to further explore the “precautionary saving motive”
as a potential channel of health risk transmission, we consider the
payment at the household level of out-of-pocket (OOP)medical expendi-
tures, as done in Rosen and Wu (2004). OOP include non-refunded ex-
penses for inpatient care, outpatient care, prescribed drugs and nursing
homes sustained in the previous 12 months, with monetary values
expressed in euros and adjusted by the purchasing power parity. Aug-
menting the basic models with OOP medical expenditures does not
alter the main result, since the health effect is in most of the cases nega-
tive, and self-reported health has larger negative explanatory power,
while the variable for OOP expenses is never signiﬁcant, revealing that
OOP medical expenditures do not strongly inﬂuence portfolio choice
(see Table 13).2 We consider one question, included in SHARE wave 2. It asks respondents “Which of
the following statements comes closest to the amount of ﬁnancial risk that you arewilling
to take when you save or make investments? 1. Take substantial ﬁnancial risks expecting
to earn substantial returns; 2. Take above average ﬁnancial risks expecting to earn above
average returns; 3. Take average ﬁnancial risks expecting to earn average returns; 4. Not
willing to take any ﬁnancial risks”. We have generated a dummy variable for risk aversion
equal to one if the respondent is not willing to take any ﬁnancial risks.11. Risk aversion and health conditions
On the basis of the analysis presented so far, while we can exclude
the hypothesis of the shortening of the life time horizon, it is quite
difﬁcult to disentangle the other two potential channels of health risk
transmission, namely the precautionary saving motive and the direct
effect on the marginal utility of consumption (pure risk aversion).
Both channels of risk transmission are likely to affect jointly portfolio
choices. As a ﬁnal test of our analysis, we explore whether the health
condition of our respondents affects their risk perception. We refer toone question contained in SHARE which should convey information
on the attitude of respondents towards ﬁnancial risk.2
We construct a dichotomous variable assuming value one if the
respondent has a high risk aversion, while zero if the respondent has a
low risk aversion. In Table 14 the dependent variable is the risk aversion
dummy, while the explanatory set is the same as in the baseline
regressions.
The marginal effect from the health proxies is positive (except for
ADL), but very low, and only EUROD is statistically signiﬁcant. Bad
health conditions might modify risk preferences towards a lower
willingness to take ﬁnancial risk, although our data would not signiﬁ-
cantly support this statement. The current health status is not a primary
driver in determining the level of risk undertaken during investments.
From the set of controls,we see howbetter education,more social activ-
ities and good numeracy abilitymight render investorsmore inclined to
assume ﬁnancial risk. Finally, we also check whether the attitude
towards risk is affecting the asset allocation. In Table 15 we see the
impact from the proxy for risk aversion on the portfolio choice. As
expected, risk averse individuals are less willing to invest in equity or
other “riskier” investments, and among the health proxies, is again
SPHEU the only variable with statistical relevance.
Table 7
Regressions for stockholding (direct and total) and risky investment.
Direct stockholding Total stockholding Risky investment
Variables All health variables All health variables All health variables
Number of limitations in activities of daily life (ADL) 0.002
(0.005)
0.007
(0.009)
0.012
(0.017)
Number of chronic diseases (chronic) −0.002
(0.003)
0.002
(0.004)
0.008
(0.008)
Self-reported health (SPHEU) −0.011**
(0.004)
−0.036***
(0.008)
−0.066***
(0.014)
Depression (EUROD) −0.001
(0.002)
0.000
(0.003)
−0.006
(0.005)
Age 0.003
(0.004)
0.013**
(0.006)
0.014
(0.011)
Age squared −0.000
(0.000)
−0.000***
(0.000)
0.000*
(0.000)
Number of household components 0.022***
(0.005)
0.033***
(0.009)
0.055***
(0.016)
Education level 0.021***
(0.002)
0.035***
(0.004)
0.073***
(0.007)
Numeracy 0.021***
(0.003)
0.033***
(0.006)
0.063***
(0.010)
Fluency 0.001**
(0.000)
0.003***
(0.001)
0.006***
(0.001)
Recall 0.005***
(0.002)
0.006**
(0.003)
0.011**
(0.005)
Employed −0.002
(0.008)
0.004
(0.013)
0.006
(0.024)
Social activities 0.025***
(0.006)
0.074***
(0.012)
0.118***
(0.019)
Probability of leaving an inheritance greater than 50,000 euro 0.001***
(0.000)
0.001***
(0.000)
0.002***
(0.000)
Household income
(in 100,000 euro)
0.004**
(0.002)
0.008
(0.006)
0.008**
(0.004)
Real assets
(in 100,000 euro)
0.001***
(0.000)
0.002***
(0.000)
0.003***
(0.001)
Household ﬁnancial assets (in 100,000 euro) 0.027***
(0.003)
0.137***
(0.008)
0.062***
(0.013)
R2 0.223 0.300 0.213
Observations 18,402 18,402 18,402
Same as in Table 6.
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Using data from the Survey of Health, Aging and Retirement in
Europe, we investigated the relationship between health conditions
and portfolio choice for a large sample of people aged 50 and more.
We inspected various proﬁles of human health using several proxies
for the health condition: self-perceived health, objective health
measured with the number of chronic conditions, and mental health
proxied by the number of symptoms of depression. We ﬁnd only a
negative statistically relationship between self-perceived health and
portfolio choices, suggesting that, the effect of poor health consists on
making safer investment decisions. The results for other threemeasures
of health are not statistically signiﬁcant suggesting that they are not
important for explaining investment decisions.
In general, our results are consistent with the theoretical underpin-
nings of background risk according to which a poor self-perceived
health status, rather than the objective health condition, entails a higher
risk of out-of-pocket medical expenditures, a higher risk of mortality,
and yields households to reduce their exposure to ﬁnancial risk. As
Idler and Benyamini (1997) pointed out, self-perceived health is an in-
dependent predictor of mortality in nearly all of the studies examined,
despite the inclusion of numerous speciﬁc health status indicators and
other relevant covariates known to predict mortality.
There are several potential reasons why the three other measures of
health status are not equally and signiﬁcantly correlated with portfolio
choices. Firstly, each of the three alternative measures reﬂect only one
dimension of overall health statuswhile the self-perceived health status
collects all these information and provides an overall evaluation of
health. Self-perceived health captures the full array of illness a personhas, and possibly even symptoms of disease. Secondly, self-perceived
health represents complex human judgments about the severity of
current illness. With the exception of Atella et al. (2012), most of the
studies considering measures of objective health did not weight the
illness in any way. However, it is clear that the severity of illness varies
over time and between individuals. This differential weightingmight be
better captured by perceived health rather than dichotomous diagnostic
categories. Thirdly, measures of objective health do not capture the
effect of comorbidity. Indeed, there may be complex interactions
between conditions that are not captured by an additive measure of
chronic diseases and that could be better captured by a comprehensive
measure of health, i.e. the self-perceived health. Finally, as Idler and Kasl
(1991) suggest, self-assessment of health reﬂects a personal estimate of
longevity that may be based not only on knowledge of the respondent's
own current health but also on the knowledge of familiar risk factors: “A
family's vulnerability to speciﬁc diseases and pattern of longevity
represents a social source of knowledge that grows as people age and
experience the death of ﬁrst grandparents and then parents” (Idler &
Kasl, 1991, page 28).
Our results are also consistent with most of the ﬁndings from
previous contributions of the literature. Feinstein and Lin (2006),
Edwards (2008), Love and Smith (2010), Cardak and Wilkins (2009)
and Yogo (2012) use only self-reported health as a measure of health
status and theyﬁnd that a poor perceived health is negatively associated
with stockmarket participation andwith the share of risky investments
in the portfolio. Atella et al. (2012) consider severalmeasures of health:
perceived health status, ameasure of objective health,weighted accord-
ing to the disease's degree of severity, and a generatedmeasure to proxy
future health risk (deﬁned as a function of risky behavior, asymptomatic
Table 9
Regressions for stockholding and risky investment — interaction term between health and expected probability of dying in the next ten years.
Variables Direct stockholding Total stockholding Risky investment
Number of limitations in activities of daily life (ADL) −0.002
(0.011)
0.006
(0.017)
−0.013
(0.032)
Number of chronic diseases (chronic) −0.006
(0.005)
−0.004
(0.008)
−0.005
(0.014)
Self-reported health (SPHEU) −0.009
(0.008)
−0.027**
(0.014)
−0.036
(0.025)
Depression (EUROD) 0.002
(0.003)
0.005
(0.005)
0.004
(0.008)
Pr. of dying within 10 years 0.000
(0.000)
0.001
(0.001)
0.002**
(0.001)
ADL ∗ pr. of dying within 10 years 0.000
(0.000)
0.000
(0.000)
0.000
(0.001)
Chronic ∗ pr. of dying within 10 years 0.000
(0.000)
0.000
(0.000)
0.000
(0.000)
SPHE ∗ pr. of dying within 10 years −0.000
(0.000)
−0.000
(0.000)
−0.001**
(0.000)
EUROD ∗ pr. of dying within 10 years −0.000
(0.000)
−0.000
(0.000)
−0.000
(0.000)
R2 0.221 0.299 0.216
Observations 17,593 17,593 17,593
Same as Table 10
Table 10
Regressions for stockholding and risky investment — ownership of private health insurance.
Variables Direct stockholding Total stockholding Risky investment
Number of limitations in activities of daily life (ADL) −0.002
(0.003)
−0.006
(0.005)
−0.017*
(0.010)
Number of chronic diseases (chronic) −0.006*
(0.003)
−0.010**
(0.005)
−0.017**
(0.009)
Self-reported health (SPHEU) −0.006**
(0.003)
−0.025***
(0.005)
−0.053***
(0.009)
Depression (EUROD) −0.002
(0.003)
−0.002
(0.005)
−0.015*
(0.009)
Health insured 0.038***
(0.008)
0.077***
(0.013)
0.156***
(0.022)
R2 0.225 0.306 0.220
Observations 19,436 19,436 19,436
Same as Table 10
Table 8
The effect of subjective health on stockholding (direct and total) and risky investment, including an interaction between health and age.
Variables Direct stockholding Total stockholding Risky investment
Number of limitations in activities of daily life (ADL) 0.0047
(0.008)
0.009
(0.016)
0.017
(0.032)
Number of chronic diseases (chronic) −0.002
(0.004)
0.005
(0.007)
0.008
(0.012)
Self-reported health (SPHEU) −0.011**
(0.006)
−0.033***
(0.010)
−0.051***
(0.018)
Depression (EUROD) 0.000
(0.002)
0.001
(0.003)
−0.003
(0.006)
Aged 65+ −.0109
(0.019)
0.003
(0.034)
0.060
(0.060)
ADL * Aged 65+ −0.005
(0.011)
−0.004
(0.019)
−0.006
(0.039)
Chronic ∗ Aged 65+ 0.000
(0.005)
−0.003
(0.009)
0.002
(0.016)
SPHEU ∗ Aged 65+ 0.002
(0.008)
−0.007
(0.014)
−0.035
(0.026)
EUROD ∗ Aged 65+ −0.002
(0.003)
−0.002
(0.005)
−0.007
(0.009)
R2 0.223 0.300 0.214
Observations 18,402 18,402 18,402
The regressions include the same set of control variables of Table 6, a dummy variable for being aged equal ormore than 65 and the interaction terms between the health variables and the
dummy variable for age 65+.
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Table 11
Regressions for stockholding and risky investment — interaction terms between health status and health insurance.
Variables Direct stockholding Total stockholding Risky investment
Number of limitations in activities of daily life
(ADL)
−0.001
(0.006)
0.003
(0.010)
−0.001
(0.020)
Number of chronic diseases (chronic) 0.002
(0.003)
0.006
(0.005)
0.015
(0.009)
Self-reported health (SPHEU) −0.015***
(0.005)
−0.045***
(0.008)
−0.088***
(0.015)
Depression (EUROD) 0.001
(0.002)
−0.001
(0.003)
−0.006
(0.006)
Health insured 0.016
(0.016)
0.022
(0.027)
0.053
(0.046)
ADL ∗ health insured 0.009
(0.010)
0.010
(0.016)
0.023
(0.029)
chronic ∗ health insured −0.008*
(0.004)
−0.011
(0.007)
−0.014
(0.013)
SPHEU ∗ health insured 0.017**
(0.007)
0.029**
(0.012)
0.056**
(0.023)
EUROD ∗ health insured −0.004
(0.003)
0.001
(0.005)
−0.002
(0.008)
R2 0.225 0.306 0.221
Observations 19,436 19,436 19,436
The regressions include the same set of control variables of Table 6, a dummy variable denoting health insurance coverage and the interaction terms between the health variables and the
dummy variable for health insurance coverage.
For direct stockholding and total stockholding we report the marginal effects estimated by a Probit model. For risky investment we report the coefﬁcients estimated by a Tobit model.
Signiﬁcance: *10%, **5%, ***1% conﬁdence levels.
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decision to hold risky assets is driven primarily by the perceived health
status rather than by the objective health condition. Poterba, Venti, and
Wise (2011) consider a simple measure of health status based on the
ﬁrst principal component of Health and Retirement Survey responses
on self-reported health status, diagnoses, activities of daily living,
instrumental activities of daily living, and other indicators of underlying
health. They ﬁnd that persons in the top third of the health distribution
accumulate at least 50% more assets than persons in the bottom third
of the health distribution. However, their health measure is ratherTable 12
Regressions for stockholding and risky investment — by public health system.
Direct stockholding
Variables NHS countries Non-NHS countr
Number of limitations in activities of daily life (ADL) 0.002
(0.006)
−0.002
(0.009)
Number of chronic diseases (chronic) 0.003
(0.003)
0.001
(0.005)
Self-reported health (SPHEU) −0.012**
(0.005)
−0.020**
(0.009)
Depression (EUROD) −0.002
(0.002)
0.004
(0.003)
Health insured −0.010
(0.021)
0.009
(.023)
ADL ∗ health insured −0.013
(0.018)
0.013
(0.013)
Chronic ∗ health insured 0.002
(0.007)
−0.009
(0.006)
SPHEU ∗ health insured 0.013
(0.012)
0.025**
(0.011)
EUROD ∗ health insured 0.002
(0.005)
−0.008*
(0.004)
R2 0.235 0.236
Observations 6955 12,481
The regressions include the same set of control variables of Table 6, a dummy variable denoting
dummy variable for health insurance coverage.
For direct stockholding and total stockholding we report the marginal effects estimated by a P
Signiﬁcance: *10%, **5%, ***1% conﬁdence levels.
NHS countries and Non-NHS countries are classiﬁed as in Atella et al. (2012).comprehensive and we cannot make a direct comparison of these
results with ours.
To the best of our knowledge, only Rosen and Wu (2004) and Coile
and Milligan (2009) provide results slightly in contrast with our
ﬁndings. The ﬁrst paper associates the health condition to speciﬁc
medical diagnoses and to an index of the individual's ability to conduct
activities of daily living, besides the self-perceived health. They show
that all these measures of health are associated with a smaller share of
ﬁnancial wealth held in risky assets in favor of a larger share held in
safe assets. The second paper does not use self-perceived health as aTotal stockholding Risky investment
ies NHS countries Non-NHS countries NHS countries Non-NHS countries
0.007
(0.010)
0.003
(0.017)
0.014
(0.025)
−0.002
(0.031)
0.005
(0.005)
0.012
(0.008)
0.025*
(0.014)
0.012
(0.012)
−0.030***
(0.008)
−0.061***
(0.015)
−0.089***
(0.022)
−0.092***
(0.022)
−0.004
(0.003)
0.004
(0.006)
−0.015*
(0.008)
−0.000
(0.008)
0.133**
(0.066)
−0.014
(0.038)
0.121
(0.096)
0.027
(0.057)
−0.032
(0.032)
0.010
(0.022)
−0.064
(0.078)
0.023
(0.038)
−0.006
(0.016)
−0.018*
(0.010)
−0.012
(0.039)
−0.016
(0.016)
−0.004
(0.023)
0.047**
(0.018)
0.044
(0.048)
0.057**
(0.028)
−0.001
(0.009)
−0.002
(0.007)
0.003
(0.023)
−0.005
(0.010)
0.340 0.279 0.247 0.210
6955 12,481 6955 12,481
health insurance coverage and the interaction terms between the health variables and the
robit model. For risky investment we report the coefﬁcients estimated by a Tobit model.
Table 13
The effect of health on stockholding and on risky investment, including out-of-pocket medical expenses.
Variables Direct stockholding Total stockholding Risky investment
(a) (b) (a) (b) (a) (b)
Number of limitations in activities of daily life (ADL) 0.001
(0.005)
0.002
(0.006)
0.006
(0.009)
0.005
(0.010)
0.010
(0.017)
0.008
(0.019)
Number of chronic diseases (chronic) −0.003
(0.003)
−0.001
(0.003)
0.002
(0.004)
0.006
(0.005)
0.008
(0.008)
0.014
(0.008)
Self-reported health (SPHEU) −0.011**
(0.004)
−0.011**
(0.005)
−0.036***
(0.008)
−0.037***
(0.008)
−0.067***
(0.014)
−0.067***
(0.014)
Depression (EUROD) −0.001
(0.002)
−0.001
(0.002)
0.000
(0.003)
0.000
(0.003)
−0.007
(0.005)
−0.007
(0.005)
OOP medical expenses
(in 100 euro)
0.000*
(0.000)
0.001
(0.001)
0.001
(0.000)
0.002
(0.002)
0.001
(0.001)
0.004
(0.003)
ADL ∗ OOP medical expenses 0.000
(0.000)
0.000
(0.000)
0.000
(0.001)
Chronic ∗ OOP medical expenses −0.000
(0.000)
−0.001***
(0.000)
−0.002**
(0.001)
SPHEU ∗ OOP medical expenses −0.000
(0.000)
0.000
(0.000)
−0.000
(0.001)
EUROD ∗ OOP medical expenses 0.000
(0.000)
0.000
(0.000)
0.000
(0.000)
R2 0.223 0.224 0.300 0.301 0.213 0.214
Observations 18,402 18,402 18,402 18,402 18,402 18,402
The regressions include the same set of control variables of Table 6.
In addition, column (a) reports the estimated output including out-of-pocketmedical expenditures (in 100 euro). Column (b) also includes the interaction terms between the health var-
iables and out-of-pocket medical expenditures.
Table 14
Regression for risk aversion.
Risk aversion (dummy variable)
Variables dy/dx
Number of limitations in activities of daily life (ADL) −0.004
(0.009)
Number of chronic diseases (chronic) 0.006
(0.004)
Self-reported health (SPHEU) 0.011
(0.007)
Depression (EUROD) 0.006**
(0.003)
Age −0.011
(0.007)
Age squared −0.000*
(0.000)
Number of household components −0.030***
(0.009)
Education level −0.030***
(0.004)
Numeracy −0.021***
(0.006)
Fluency −0.002*
(0.001)
Recall −0.002
(0.003)
Employed −0.021
(0.014)
Social activities −0.049***
(0.010)
Probability of leaving an inheritance greater than 50,000 euro −0.001***
(0.000)
Household income (in 100,000 euro) 0.000
(0.000)
Real assets (in 100,000 euro) −0.000**
(0.000)
Household ﬁnancial assets (in 100,000 euro) −0.002***
(0.000)
R2 0.149
Observations 12,345
Estimation is performed on individuals classiﬁed as “ﬁnancial respondents”.
Signiﬁcance: *10%, **5%, ***1% conﬁdence levels.
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Table 15
Regressions for stockholding and risky investment, controlling for risk aversion.
Variables Direct stockholding Total stockholding Risky investment
Number of limitations in activities of daily life (ADL) 0.000
(0.006)
0.006
(0.012)
0.020
(0.025)
Number of chronic diseases (chronic) 0.000
(0.003)
0.001
(0.005)
0.006
(0.009)
Self-reported health (SPHEU) −0.010**
(0.005)
−0.027***
(0.009)
−0.050***
(0.016)
Depression (EUROD) −0.001
(0.002)
−0.001
(0.003)
−0.005
(0.006)
Risk aversion (dummy variable) −0.090***
(0.011)
−0.176***
(0.018)
−0.265***
(0.025)
Age −0.002
(0.005)
0.004
(0.009)
0.016
(0.015)
Age squared 0.000
(0.000)
−0.000
(0.000)
0.000
(0.000)
Number of household components 0.013**
(0.007)
0.014
(0.012)
−0.075***
(0.021)
Education level 0.013***
(0.003)
0.027***
(0.005)
0.052***
(0.008)
Numeracy 0.013***
(0.004)
0.022***
(0.007)
0.065***
(0.012)
Fluency 0.001*
(0.001)
0.004***
(0.001)
0.006***
(0.002)
Recall 0.007***
(0.002)
0.010***
(0.004)
0.009
(0.006)
Employed −0.003
(0.010)
0.025
(0.018)
0.061**
(0.030)
Social activities 0.011
(0.006)
0.042***
(0.013)
0.072***
(0.020)
Probability of leaving an inheritance greater than 50,000 euro 0.001***
(0.000)
0.001***
(0.000)
0.003***
(0.000)
Household income (in 100,000 euro) 0.000**
(0.000)
0.001
(0.000)
0.001
(0.000)
Real assets (in 100,000 euro) 0.000***
(0.000)
0.000*
(0.000)
0.000
(0.000)
Household ﬁnancial assets (in 100,000 euro) 0.003***
(0.000)
0.018***
(0.003)
0.005***
(0.001)
R2 0.244 0.328 0.255
Observations 12,345 12,345 12,345
Estimation is performed on individuals classiﬁed as “ﬁnancial respondents”.
Signiﬁcance: *10%, **5%, ***1% conﬁdence levels.
122 S. Bressan et al. / International Review of Financial Analysis 32 (2014) 109–122measure of health status and focuses only on the inﬂuence of health
shocks on the household's ownership of various assets, as well as on
the dollar value and the share of total assets held in each asset class.
The results suggest that the effect of acute events such as heart attack
or stroke, or the effect of a newly diagnosed chronic illness reduces
the probability of stocks and bonds holdings, while raises the share of
assets held in bank accounts.References
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